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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT IN REPLY
Thurston’s1 response is more notable for what it omits than anything it says. In particular,
Thurston does not deny, attempt to minimize, or even address the indisputable fact it never lost a
single dollar of its own historical sales due to the acquisitions about which it complains. That is
the appropriate context in which to consider what is, in reality, no more than an ordinary contract
dispute over how to interpret “account protection.” As shown in the reply arguments below, SBS’s
historically-based narrower interpretation is the reasonable one under the plain language. Thurston
cannot show otherwise or that its other claims do not suffer from fatal legal errors.
Instead, all that Thurston offers is a fictional narrative mischaracterizing the BAM program
as a scheme by Deluxe (exonerated already) to generate hundreds of millions in profits “at the
expense” of legacy distributors. This narrative falls flat given the undisputed fact that Thurston did
not lose any previously held business and, to the contrary, stands to gain hundreds of thousands
(and potentially millions) more only as a result of the conduct about which it now complains. At
its worst, the picture Thurston depicts is one of a rising tide that lifts all boats. Yet, the fact is the
BAM program was not a huge boon of profits for SBS (or Deluxe). [See Tr. Vol. II at 2017:122018:15 (SBS’s President discussing how program failed to meet projections).] Rather, the big
numbers Thurston throws around—such as the supposed hundreds of millions “made off the BAM
Program” [see Respondent’s Brief (“Resp. Br.”) at 53]—refer to revenue alone,2 a misleading and
incomplete part of the accounting equation (which Thurston also improperly uses to measure
damages) that ignores the corresponding costs and expenses incurred to generate such revenue and

1

All capitalized terms not defined herein are defined in Appellant’s Brief.

2

Thurston, in fact, identifies the figures as “revenue” earlier in its brief [see Resp. Br. at 13 n.2]
and misstates the evidence at that. The revenue projections Thurston cites were far less in regard
to the BAM program. [See e.g., Tr. Vol. I at 317:8-13 ($72 million).]

1

operate a business that allows low-overhead commissioned sales agents like Thurston to succeed
for thirty years or more. If anything, the BAM program created more stability for Thurston than
profit for SBS because it resulted in a purchase of companies that could otherwise cut into
Thurston’s historical sales. This explains in large part why Thurston lost no sales of its own after
the acquisitions and instead increased its profits. [See R. 19598 (graph of commissions).]
Nonetheless, Thurston still seeks to vilify SBS as a malicious corporate actor worthy of the
“maximum punitive damages allowed under Idaho law.” [Resp. Br. at 7.] Thurston argues such a
penalty is warranted because SBS knew there would be account protection issues (impacting, at
most, 1.9% of Thurston’s 4,000 accounts (or $45,529 in sales))3 and because it was allegedly
“oppressive” for SBS to seek to purchase the small percentage of Thurston’s account protection
rights affected on the well-understood basis that such rights are worth only so much as a distributor
itself can earn off them. What Thurston suggests instead—relying on an overly broad interpretation
of account protection—is that substantial portions of the DocuSource/IBF business SBS purchased
should have been turned over to Thurston for free, even if there were “exclusive” contracts
Thurston could not assume, customers that had unique specialized requirements Thurston could
not fulfill, or it would have resulted in a loss of customers altogether because they did not want to
purchase from Thurston. [See Tr. Vol. II at 1920:2-1924:11.]4 Otherwise, Thurston can only be

3

Thurston attempts to grossly overstate the overlap by comparing the jury’s total damages for
account protection ($494,526) to Thurston’s annual sales ($798,526). [See Resp. Br. at 47 n.27.]
The damages awarded by the jury included: (i) three years of “gross profits” from 2014-2016, plus
(ii) more than eight years of speculative future losses. The evidence from Thurston’s own expert
firmly establishes the overlap on a year-to-year basis was 1.9% of Thurston’s 4,000 accounts,
where it had an annual sales total of only $45,529. [See App. Br. at 33 & n.15 (citing evidence).]
4

[See also Tr. Vol. I at 1053:5-1055:7; Ex. 266 (further discussing customer requirements).]

2

demanding that SBS should not have made any acquisitions in the first place, leaving 260+
distributors and thousands of employees at risk as the market evolved.
In reality, there was no scheme to harm distributors (or anyone). The acquisitions simply
made good economic sense given the changing market and timing. No one could reasonably have
anticipated that what occurred here would occur – i.e., an award of “gross profits” on crossover
sales to entire organizations by name alone plus excessively speculative future damages for 8+
years, duplicative good faith-fair dealing (“GFFD”) damages on top of all that, and then punitive
damages multiplying everything by a further factor of three. The parties agreed in their contract to
a remedial structure that provides for up to 36 months of account protection and, in the event of a
termination, agreed to pay Thurston 50% of commissions on “repeat” sales (which reflect the right
is limited to Thurston’s sales only) for up to four years after a termination. [See Ex. 8 at 8.8-8.9 (¶
9) (post-termination payments).] If SBS had any idea a potential 1.9% customer overlap
(theoretically affecting only $45,529 of Thurston’s sales) could somehow be manufactured into a
$6.8 million judgment, it certainly never would have done the acquisitions. Notably and ironically,
however, all indications are that Thurston would be worse off if the acquisitions had not occurred.
Clearly, the imposition of punitive damages in this contract case greatly distorts matters.
In the end, this entire suit is founded on a simple contract dispute between two sophisticated
commercial parties over how to construe the ambiguous concept of “account protection.” As such,
there is no legitimate reason to award punitive damages even under current standards of Idaho law,
particularly since Thurston shows no special harm to itself and is made more than whole by
compensatory damages. The only justification Thurston offers for what can be described as
nothing less than a windfall of $6.8 million—far in excess of any contractual expectation Thurston
could have ever had—is a mere recitation of the word “deterrence.” Yet, as the authorities provide,

3

deterrence in a commercial context such as this (as opposed to a small insurance or consumer case)
really means that businesses will be more wary of entering into contracts at all in Idaho.
Due to the errors discussed in the opening brief and addressed further below, this Court
should reverse Thurston’s judgment and eliminate specific claims as a matter of law.
REPLY ARGUMENT
I.

THE CONTRACT’S ACCOUNT PROTECTION LANGUAGE IS AMBIGUOUS; THE DISTRICT
COURT ERRED IN RULING IT WAS BREACHED AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Thurston acknowledges that “account protection” is the central issue for all claims – in

fact, the “backbone” of its entire case. [See Resp. Br. at 7.] Accordingly, an error by the District
Court in its interpretation of the contract requires a full reversal of Thurston’s judgment. That is
exactly what must occur because Thurston fails to refute the plain language is ambiguous.
At the outset, Thurston incorrectly asserts a broad overall waiver in arguing that SBS
“conceded” at trial the correctness of Thurston’s interpretation of account protection. [See Resp.
Br. at 19.] That is preposterous given the procedural posture. For a waiver to occur, there must be
“a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage.” Pocatello Hosp., LLC v.
Quail Ridge Med. Inv’r, LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 719, 330 P.3d 1067, 1077 (2014) (emphasis added).
As part of the District Court’s incorrect summary judgment ruling on liability, however, the court
ordered that only damages could be contested at trial. [See R. 5814-15.] SBS had no choice but to
proceed at trial as if the District Court’s liability ruling was correct and dispute damages on that
theory. SBS thus offered an accountant from its finance department who calculated the proper
amount of damages that would result from the District Court’s liability ruling. [See Tr. Vol. II at
1961:3-22 (testifying approximately $200,000 in commissions would be due for DocuSource/IBF
sales to organizations overlapping by name alone).] Thurston’s attorney cross-examined that
witness in an attempt to paint SBS as a bad actor for not paying that to Thurston prior to trial, to

4

which the witness appropriately responded that no payment was made because the matter (i.e., the
legal interpretation) was disputed. [See Tr. Vol. II. at 1975:15-1976:19.] No waiver occurred by
that testimony5 or otherwise, nor could it possibly occur given the District Court’s prior ruling.
As a result, Thurston appears to be implying that SBS could not address damages at trial
without necessarily waiving its right to appeal the District Court’s liability ruling. That is not
consistent with Idaho law on preserving error6 or waiver. Nor would it be a prudent rule to adopt
because it would require a defendant in SBS’s position—where liability is already determined by
a court—to argue to a jury that the court committed legal error, no doubt drawing the immediate
ire and admonishment of the judge (if not sanctions). Issue 1 was not waived at trial.
Thurston next offers scant arguments on the merits that fail to show there is no ambiguity.
First, Thurston asserts the phrase “new and repeat … sales” in Paragraph 3 of the Interim
Distributor Agreement [Ex. 8 at 8.3 (¶ 3)] means its account protection extended to all sales to a
customer even if involving unique products/services that Thurston never sold (or offered) the
customer before. [See Resp. Br. at 20.]7 That is Thurston’s interpretation, but not the only (or
5

SBS’s counsel also objected on the basis that the witness had no authority to answer, which is
apparent given the legal conclusion inherent in the question. [See Tr. Vol. II at 1975:25-1976:5.]
6

All that is required is an adverse ruling—such as the District Court’s ruling on summary judgment
here—to preserve appeal. See In re Guardianship of Doe, 157 Idaho 750, 758, 339 P.3d 1154,
1162 (2014) (party not required to seek reconsideration to preserve appeal); Idaho Power Co. v.
Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 151 Idaho 266, 279, 255 P.3d 1152, 1165 (2011) (“It is well established
that in order for an issue to be raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling which
forms the basis for an assignment of error.”).
7

Thurston generically asserts it could sell the same products as IBF, but the evidence does not
support that claim. The W-2 processing sold by IBF was uniquely developed by that company [see
Tr. Vol. II at 1221:25-1223:12] and customized items like medical ID bands are not listed in
Thurston’s cited affidavit. [See Resp. Br. at 19 n.6 (citing R. 4432-33).] Further, the ability to sell
a particular type of product does not speak to the specialized or high-volume requirements
demanded by IBF’s customers, such as the warehousing and drop shipping necessary for “same
day” service. [See Tr. Vol. II at 1923:8-18; see also id. at 1225:15-19.] Further, even assuming

5

correct) one. Rather, the phrase “new and repeat” is fully consistent with SBS’s product-specific
view because the word “new” in that context does not necessarily mean products a distributor has
never sold or offered a customer before. While a repeat of the original order for a product/service
would have the exact same quantity or terms as before, a new order for the identical product/service
would be one with a different quantity or terms. That is the interpretation supported by common
definitions. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 834 (11th ed. 2009) (defining
“new” as both “the resumption or repetition of a previous act or thing” and “from one of the same
category that has existed previously”) (emphasis added).8 As such, the phrase “new and repeat …
sales” is easily limited to only the specific products Thurston was first to sell to a customer and
does not include unique specialized products that Thurston never sold or offered to a customer

Thurston could make such specialized sales, the evidence demonstrates Thurston consciously
chose not to in the past since it operated without a warehouse or inventory (benefiting from low
overhead) and relying instead on low-volume sales averaging $200 per year to a broad customer
base (4,000). As such, Thurston and DocuSource/IBF were operating in completely different
markets, even for the small percentage (1.9%) of overlapping organizations that both had sold to
for years prior to the acquisitions. [See Ex. 68 (Thurston offering inside information on IBF prior
to SBS’s acquisition); Tr. Vol. I at 1113:24-1114:15 (Thurston long familiar with IBF’s accounts).]
8

The conjunctive form of the phrase “new and repeat” further supports the conclusion that the
language is referring to additional sales of the same product/service over which account protection
was obtained rather than an entire customer by name. Idaho law interprets “or” as “a disjunctive
particle used to express an alternative or to give a choice of one among two or more things,”
Phillips v. Gomez, 162 Idaho 803, 810, 405 P.3d 588, 595 (Idaho 2017), whereas the conjunctive
“and” joins items. See, e.g., In re Brink, 117 Idaho 55, 57, 785 P.2d 619, 621 (1990) (“The word
‘and’, as used in ‘probable cause to stop and request’, is plainly conjunctive. It joins together the
words ‘stop’ and ‘request’. The result is that the officer must have probable cause to stop the driver
and probable cause to request that the driver submit to a blood alcohol content test.”). That
establishes the word “new” in “new and repeat … sales” is being used in a complementary form
to emphasize the right applies to additional sales of products for which account protection was
obtained, not entirely “new” products/services that Thurston never sold to a customer before.

6

(such as IBF’s W-2 processing or medical ID bands). SBS’s interpretation of account protection
as product-specific is supported by the plain language. The District Court erred in ruling otherwise.
Thurston’s brief goes on to make some odd contentions that are easily dismissed. For
example, Thurston asserts its contract applies account protection to entire customers without
regard to products sold (despite the defined term of “Safeguard Systems” being based on product
addenda), yet cites only an “attachment” to a different asset purchase agreement. [See Resp. Br. at
21 (citing Ex. 387, which is KMMR’s purchase in April 2015).]9 It is only the language in the four
corners of Thurston’s contract that matters, not unrelated extrinsic documents. Even more bizarre
is Thurston’s contention that the definition of Safeguard Systems should be disregarded as
“inserting provisions” into the contract that “are not there.” [See Resp. Br. at 21.] Contractual
definitions are fundamental to determining contract rights. See Idaho Trust Bank v. Christian, 154
Idaho 657, 659, 301 P.3d 1275, 1277 (2013) (parties “are free to define in the contract words that
are used therein, even if those definitions vary from the normal meanings of the words,” and using
contract definition to construe rights). It is only when a term is undefined that this Court looks to
common usage, such as dictionary definitions. See Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 62,
175 P.3d 748, 751 (2007) (using Webster’s to determine meaning of “working day” when term not
defined in contract). The contract’s definition of “Safeguard Systems” must be considered and,
when considered, demonstrates ambiguity as to whether the account protection right is productspecific. [See App. Br. at 13.] Thurston also contradictorily attempts to sidestep Idaho law in regard
to undefined words as well, relying on a Wisconsin case to suggest there is no latent ambiguity
with the term “customer.” [See Resp. Br. at 22 (citing Mattheis by Vowinkel v. Heritage Mut. Ins.
9

Notably as well, the customer list Thurston cites—pages 5-64 of Exhibit 387—has a column
identifying the specific “contact” person for many organizations, which supports SBS’s
interpretation of the right as limited to specific billing points within larger organizations.

7

Co., 487 N.W.2d 52 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1992)).] However, Mattheis ruled the word “customer” was
not ambiguous only in the context of the specific insurance contract it was interpreting in that case
because the relevant policy exclusion was not directed at a person’s “status” as a purchaser. Id. at
53-55 (finding exclusion meant to apply when a customer of the mechanic shop that was insured
had their own insurance to cover the wreck of a loaner car, which would include a family member
who was not the actual purchaser of services). That case has no application here because the term
“customer” in the Interim Distributor Agreement plainly is directed at a person’s status as a
purchaser of Safeguard products. As shown in the evidence SBS submitted at summary judgment
[see R. 5400-04, 5453-5528], there is a latent ambiguity regarding whether “customer” means an
entire organization by name alone or only the specific billing points within an organization.
Lastly, Thurston offers a bevy of unfounded assertions for partial waiver. Thurston claims
SBS’s trial counsel “conceded” during oral argument on summary judgment that the unique
products/services developed and sold by IBF are all “Safeguard Systems” for purposes of
Thurston’s contract addenda. [See Resp. Br. at 21] That contention is debunked in the opening
brief. [See Appellant’s Brief (“App. Br.”) at 14 n.8 (noting counsel’s colloquy with the District
Court was acknowledging only that the products were Safeguard Systems for IBF’s contract; not
Thurston’s contract).] In any case, a legal determination of contract language should not be based
on such a vague colloquy. The contract language itself controls. Thurston next claims the latent
ambiguity with the term “customer” was never raised to the court below. [See Resp. Br. at 22.] To
the contrary, SBS discussed it in great detail in SBS’s summary judgment opposition [see R. 540002], as fully acknowledged by the District Court’s order. [See R. 5812 (noting: “Safeguard asserts
that the Account Protection described in the RDA is product-specific and account-specific, and
originated as a methodology to prevent a distributor from losing the commissions on a sale of a
particular product to a particular customer”) (emphasis added).] Either way, this Court requires

8

only that an “issue” be raised to the court below, not the exact same legal argument. See Ada Cty.
Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, 143n.2, 395 P.3d 357, 361 n.2 (2017). Finally,
Thurston appears to incorrectly suggest that SBS cannot rely on the testimony of its own executives
to show latent ambiguity if those individuals were not present when the contract was executed
three decades ago. [See Resp. Br. at 23.] Thurston confuses the evidence needed to show a latent
ambiguity with establishing intent at the time of contracting. There is no time limitation on
demonstrating a latent ambiguity. See Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 455, 259 P.3d
595, 601 (2011) (“Where the facts in existence reveal a latent ambiguity in a contract, the court
seeks to determine what the intent of the parties was at the time they entered into the contract.”)
(emphasis added); In re Estate of Kirk, 127 Idaho 817, 824, 907 P.2d 794, 801 (1995) (after-thefact extrinsic evidence regarding how documents kept in binder by testator established latent
ambiguity). Furthermore, the record fails to show Thurston moved to strike SBS’s summary
judgment affidavits for lack of personal knowledge or any other evidentiary ground.10 As such,
Thurston waived its evidentiary objections for purposes of this appeal. The testimony SBS
submitted regarding what a “customer” means (i.e., specific billing points within an organization)
was more than sufficient to demonstrate a fact issue precluding summary judgment.
For all the reasons identified by SBS in its opening brief and above, there is ambiguity
regarding the meaning of account protection that required a denial of Thurston’s summary
judgment. The District Court erred in failing to do so. Thurston’s judgment must be reversed.

10

Further, the testimony SBS offered is admissible through several hearsay exceptions. See, e.g.,
I.R.E. 803(20) (reputation concerning “general history”); 803(24) (“equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness”); 804 (unavailability of person executing contract 30 years ago).
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT’S ERROR AS TO ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE STILL REQUIRES
VACATING THE JUDGMENT IN FULL.
As to Issue 2, Thurston makes misplaced waiver arguments and offers no legal support for

the District Court’s ruling on attorney-client privilege. None of Thurston’s points have merit, but
SBS will nevertheless simplify the review in terms of the documents at issue, as provided below.
A.

SBS Limits its Appeal to the Documents Identified by Thurston.

Thurston incorrectly claims that SBS’s privilege as to fourteen documents identified in the
opening brief were waived by production because only seven match up by Bates label to the
District Court’s order. [See Resp. Br. at 24 n.10 (identifying Exhibits 157, 245, 267, 327, 336, 352,
and 356 as matching).] The privilege was not voluntarily waived as Thurston contends (and SBS
reserves the right to litigate the matter further on remand or otherwise). In any event, to simplify
the review at this point, SBS agrees to limit its arguments on Issue 2 to the seven documents
identified by Thurston. Those documents are sufficient to mandate reversal on their own. As such,
the term “Privileged Documents” for the opening brief and this reply is hereby redefined to
encompass only Exhibits 157, 245, 267, 327, 336, 352, and 356, as identified by Thurston.
B.

Attorney-Client Privilege Was Not Waived by Contesting Damages at Trial.

Thurston misstates the case law it cites to argue a waiver occurred as to the seven redefined
Privileged Documents on the basis that SBS failed to object to their admission during trial. [See
Resp. Br. at 25.] In particular, Thurston cites Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 116 P.3d 27
(2005), for the proposition that a party “is required to continue to object as the evidence is
presented” or else they waive privilege. [See Resp. Br. at 25.] That is not what Kirk provides.
Indeed, the partial quote offered by Thurston refers only to what a party must do to preserve error
when a court’s ruling on an objection is deferred after denying a motion in limine. See Kirk, 141
Idaho at 701-02. In that instance, a party must object as evidence is presented so the court can rule
or else the objection is waived. That is not what occurred here. Prior to trial, the District Court
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fully overruled SBS’s assertion of privilege without qualification. [See R. 2226-27.] Kirk provides
that no objections at trial are necessary to preserve error in the circumstances present in this case.
See 141 Idaho at 702. Thurston’s selective quotation of State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 932 P.2d
907 (Ct. App. 1997), likewise fails because, in context, that case stands for the proposition that
evidence a court excludes by granting a motion in limine must still be objected to if nonetheless
offered at trial by the other party. See id. at 794 (“Agreeing to the admission of evidence which
was previously deemed inadmissible11 is a waiver of the prior objection.”) (emphasis added).
Again, that is not the issue here. The District Court did not sustain SBS’s privilege and Thurston
nonetheless offer the privileged documents at trial without objection or by stipulation (indeed,
Thurston never would have had the documents in that scenario); rather, SBS’s privilege was fully
overruled prior to trial. There was no obligation for SBS to object further at trial and any stipulation
to the admission of the documents was knowingly made only in regard to all evidentiary grounds
not yet ruled upon by the District Court (e.g., authenticity, relevance, hearsay, etc.). Thurston’s
proposed requirement that a party repeatedly object after being overruled serves no legitimate
purpose other than to delay proceedings and prejudice a party by unnecessarily irritating a trial
judge. There is no requirement in Idaho law to do that in order to preserve error.
As a result, there was no waiver by SBS of the right to appeal the District Court’s ruling.
C.

Thurston Fails to Demonstrate the District Court Could Rely on Federal
Cases to Create a Presumption Against In-House Counsel.

As to the substance of the District Court’s ruling on attorney-client privilege, there is no
dispute by Thurston that I.R.E. 502 does not state a presumption against in-house lawyers (or make
any distinction among “lawyers”). Rather, Thurston justifies the District Court’s order primarily

11

The emphasized words are omitted in Thurston’s citation. [See Resp. Br. at 25.]
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on the basis of federal cases. [See Resp. Br. at 26.] Idaho law does not support doing so in this
instance.
Indeed, it is well recognized that, while district courts in Idaho have discretion in their
evidentiary rulings, the power to exercise such discretion does not include altering or disregarding
specific rules and standards. In 2009, this Court quoted with approval the following by Judge
Burnett regarding the type of “broad discretion” asserted by Thurston:
The law of evidence is structured by rules, forged by centuries of experience and
continually tested against evolving notions of fairness and truth-seeking. Our
Supreme Court recently has adopted a detailed and painstakingly drafted formulation
of such rules. See Idaho Rules of Evidence (effective July 1, 1985). These rules are
not mere precatory guides to discretion; they are standards controlling the outcome
of evidentiary questions. A trial judge possesses no ‘discretionary’ authority to alter
or to disregard specific standards—particularly in criminal trials, where these
standards impart real meaning to an accused’s right to a fair trial. Discretion is
properly exercised only when a rule of evidence calls for it.
State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 421, 224 P.3d 485, 488 (2009) (quoting State v. Maylett, 108
Idaho 671, 674, 701 P.2d 291, 294 (Ct. App. 1985)). The principle articulated by Judge Burnett
should be equally applicable to protect a person’s right to a fair trial in a civil case or arbitration.
Contrary to the rule of Watkins, however, the District Court here improperly modified I.R.E. 502
to overrule SBS’s privilege by incorporating a presumption against in-house counsel that is
recognized by only a small number of federal district courts. [See R. 2221.] Those courts, however,
are expressly allowed to do so under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which provides that:
The common law – as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and
experience – governs a claim of privilege unless any of the following provides
otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; or rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court … [or state law when it supplies the rule of decision.]”
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The Idaho Rules of Evidence do not grant such power to Idaho courts. Thus, the District Court had
no authority to rely on federal cases to create a new presumption not stated in I.R.E. 502.12
There is no justification for a presumption either. The reason that I.R.E. 502 does not make
a distinction between in-house and outside lawyers is because the rule was drafted to incorporate
the concepts of protecting attorney-client privilege articulated by I.C. § 9-203, which states:
There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to encourage
confidence and to preserve it inviolate; therefore … [a]n attorney cannot, without
the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client
to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment. The
word client used herein shall be deemed to include a person, a corporation or an
association.
I.C. § 9-203(2) (emphasis added). Accordingly, I.R.E. 502(5) provides that the privilege applies
to any confidential communication between lawyer and client regardless of whether it contains
facts, so long as it is in “furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services.” Notably, I.R.E.
502 does not define “professional legal services,” instead leaving it to the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct (“IRPC”). Under the IRPC, professional legal services includes far more
than “pure legal advice,” stating in the preamble that “a lawyer performs various functions” before
going on to list a few of those as advisor, advocate, negotiator, and evaluator of a client’s legal
affairs. See IRPC, Preamble at [2]. The rendition of professional legal services thus expressly
includes communications between lawyer and client that may not appear on their face to be
requesting or providing legal advice. The full context of the communication matters and the scope
12

An Idaho district court may follow federal cases when interpreting Idaho rules only when the
applicable versions contain identical language. See Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792,
796, 41 P.3d 220, 224 (2001) (“The above-quoted language in Chacon stated our preference for
interpreting the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in conformance with the interpretation placed upon
the same language in the federal rules. That preference is obviously limited to situations in which
our rules and the federal rules contain identical language.”). The Idaho Rules of Evidence do not
contain a counterpart identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 501.
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of privilege is far broader than Thurston (or the District Court) recognized. In particular, a lawyer
acting as a negotiator for his or her client—as Dunlap did for SBS in trying to resolve account
protection—is expressly rendering a professional legal service.
Accordingly, the District Court abused its discretion by construing I.R.E. 502 to contain a
presumption against in-house counsel and limiting the privilege to “pure legal advice.”
D.

The Record Demonstrates Prejudice Against SBS.

Thurston contends the District Court’s error was “harmless” [see Resp. Br. at 29], but that
is contradicted by Thurston’s own actions at trial. Thurston made sure all the Privileged
Documents were submitted to the jury and specifically relied on them for the presentation of
evidence and closing argument. In particular, Thurston examined SBS’s General Counsel, Michael
Dunlap, in significant detail on Exhibits 157 and 267 [see Tr. Vol. I at 879:7-885:12, 983:2-986:7,
994:13-998:11], and SBS’s President, J.J. Sorrenti, in regard to Exhibits 327, 336, and 356. [See
Tr. Vol. II at 1281:20-1285:8, 1289:17-1291:21, 1296:5-1299:2.] Further, Thurston based a large
part of its closing argument on Dunlap’s role as a lawyer and legal matters discussed in the
Privileged Documents, as reflected by the following sample of statements by Thurston’s counsel,
highlighting the advice given to SBS by its in-house counsel:


“And there’s only one way around that, you’ve got to violate the contract. You’ve
got to say we’re going to figure another way to get out of it, and it’s going to be
extra legal, but we’re going to use our lawyer, who I referred to as the utility tool,
and I said that for this reason: Lawyers represent clients. Lawyers are servants for
their master, the client. They don’t run the business, they do the dirty work. That’s
what lawyers do, and that is what Mr. Dunlap did.” [Tr. Vol. II at 2237:16-24.]



“So what does the lawyer [Dunlap] say, he says to his client, Sorrenti, ‘She should
get together with Dawn ASAP and transfer the files unless the decisions previously
made are reversed.’ Mr. Sorrenti doesn’t miss a beat, ‘Since the decision, in
essence, is being appealed, can you and I sit down with this data’ etcetera.” [Tr.
Vol. II at 2257:6-12 (quoting Exhibit 267).]
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“So what happens then? Sorrenti is talking to Dunlap who says to him, you know,
this is kind of a problem. He says, ‘The risk here is still that Ms. Teply may claim
or request all commissions paid to IBF since they became a Safeguard entity, sort
of like what the Strongs are claiming.’ ” [Tr. Vol. II at 2258:19-24 (quoting Exhibit
327).]



“So go to the next one, please. I am mentioning to you this notion that there’s no
question that Safeguard knows exactly what its account protection provides for, and
here is the perfect proof of it. Remember I told you in September of 2013 Dunlap
was trying to set up a meeting with McLaughlin and Dawn and Roger for October
2nd. And these people -- he’s the lawyer, he couldn’t get her to give him the time
of day. She wouldn’t make herself available. And so he says to Tiller Shumway at
Safeguard, ‘We simply tell distributor accounting that if there is a conflict with the
legacy distributors, the rule applies and it rotates to the legacy distributor.’ ” [Tr.
Vol. II at 2268:10-22 (quoting Exhibit 157).]

All of the closing statements above were based on privileged information disclosed to Thurston
only as a result of the District Court’s attorney-client privilege ruling. This demonstrates sufficient
prejudice. Indeed, as this Court has noted, the prejudice caused by erroneous disclosure of
attorney-client privilege is “obvious” without undertaking any analysis of whether a jury relied on
the information. See State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 621, 682 P.2d 571, 574 (1984); see also
Frontier Ref., Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., Inc., 136 F.3d 695, 706 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding prejudice
in that “[t]here is too great a risk that a jury would accord significant or undue weight to the
testimony and admissions of a party’s own lawyers”). Indeed, to speculate the jury here did not
place any weight on the Privileged Documents is implausible, particularly since, as Thurston
highlights, the jury awarded the maximum amount of punitive damages possible against SBS
whereas, in contrast, Deluxe was exonerated in full. If anything, Thurston’s own actions
demonstrate that Thurston viewed the Privileged Documents as critically important to its case.
Thurston’s citation of Naccarato v. Vill. of Priest River, 68 Idaho 368, 195 P.2d 370 (1948),
does not change that conclusion. Naccarato involved routine evidence that “varied from the
pleadings,” not an improper disclosure of the “inviolate” attorney-client privilege. Id. at 373; I.C.
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§ 9-203(2). Further, the quote from Naccarato, offered only in truncated form by Thurston, is cited
in full here and described a situation far different from this case: “Error, if any, in admitting
irrelevant or improper testimony is harmless where the fact which is intended to be proved thereby
is fully shown by other evidence which was introduced previously or subsequently without
objection.” Id. (emphasis added to show excerpt that Thurston omits). The Privileged Documents
were introduced only after the District Court overruled SBS’s privilege. Naccarato does not apply.
In sum, the District Court abused its discretion in construing I.R.E. 502, and that error
prejudiced SBS because Thurston relied heavily on the Privileged Documents at trial to obtain its
judgment. The judgment for Thurston must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
III.

THE FRAUD CLAIM FAILS REGARDLESS OF A DUTY TO DISCLOSE.
As to Issue 3, while Thurston provides a list of bullets that summarize the evidence its

attorneys were able to construct for a “fraud” claim [see Resp. Br. at 30], that evidence is irrelevant
to the legal issue on appeal. The District Court’s post-judgment ruling determined, under I.R.C.P.
50(b), that Thurston was aware of post-acquisition sales by IBF to all nine organizations in at least
a “trivial” or “insignificant” amount.13 [See R. 12733.]
Therefore, the only question is whether the District Court, after making a determination of
what the evidence supported, properly concluded the jury could still return a verdict of fraud in
favor of Thurston despite Thurston’s awareness of any amount of post-acquisition sales by IBF to
each of the nine organizations. The issue boils down to whether the District Court employed faulty
logic for its legal conclusion when denying JNOV on the fraud claim. Framed in the arguments of
13

Thurston certainly knew the sales were far more than “insignificant” as exemplified by the
$27,000 it received for Norco when Thurston’s own sales to that company were minimal. [See Tr.
Vol. II at 1872:24-1875:8 (Mr. Thurston stating Dunlap offered $25,000 on Norco and “… with
that I thought that he knew more information on what IBF, which he did as far as the product lines,
so I figured he was reflecting what IBF was selling in there …”) (emphasis added).]
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the parties’ briefs, the point of contention is whether the fraud claim depends on Thurston’s
awareness of: (a) any sales occurring at all or (b) the specific dollar amount of sales.
Thurston contends it is the latter, asserting SBS had an implied contractual duty to disclose
to Thurston the specific dollar amount of ongoing sales by IBF—based on a broad notion of
account protection—through a claimed right to receive monthly “rotated” commissions on IBF’s
post-acquisition sales as they were made. [See Resp. Br. at 32 (citing R. 5830).] Notably, that is
all moot if the scope of the account protection right is ambiguous (which makes the fraud claim
derivative of that error). Nonetheless, the fraud claim still fails on its own because the fact that no
rotated commissions were paid at all, in any amount, while Thurston knew any sales were
occurring to each organization, only reinforces the conclusion that Thurston was aware of the
omission upon which it relies. Given the District Court’s conclusion that the evidence shows Mr.
Thurston knew post-acquisition sales were occurring to each of the nine organizations—regardless
of a subjective assumption14 that they were “insignificant” or “trivial”—while also knowing he
was not receiving the specific dollar amount of those sales (by rotated commissions or otherwise),
establishes that Thurston’s decision to enter into the March 2014 agreement on the basis of its own
sales figures was not due to fraud. Rather, it was a conscious choice made by Mr. Thurston to
forgo the known missing information and value the transaction based on something else.

14

The evidence reflects, at best, a subjective assumption since both sides agreed Dunlap provided
zero information on the amount of IBF’s sales. It is further noteworthy that Mr. Thurston touted
he was a 30-year veteran of the business who had special “inside information” on IBF [see Ex. 68]
and was long aware of IBF’s operations [see Tr. Vol. I at 1113:24-1114:15; Tr. Vol. II at 1786:59 (testifying he knew IBF was “in the accounts we have” as well)], and that when Mr. Thurston
first requested sales information as to specific customers, only after the March 2014 transaction
[see Ex. 309.1 (April 2014); see also Ex. 310.2 (acknowledging he knew of post-acquisition sales
well before then)], the requested information was in fact provided by Dunlap. [See Ex. 311.]
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Therefore, Thurston’s response argument changes nothing. There is no fraud regardless of
a duty to disclose. This Court should eliminate the claim and damages ($442,400, plus $1,327,200
in related punitive damages) regardless of whether the judgment is otherwise reversed.
IV.

THE “PRICING” CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Thurston misconstrues SBS’s appeal as to Issue 4 as well – the so-called “pricing” claim.

SBS makes no challenge to a jury finding or determination. The only challenge is to the District
Court’s ruling that the relevant contract provision is ambiguous. Determining ambiguity is a legal
matter decided by a court alone, see Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.3d
748, 751 (2007) (“free review” over ambiguity), and the plain language of Paragraph 1 does not
create any guarantee of uniformity in the way alleged by Thurston.
Thurston’s primary contention is that the words “in accordance with the price schedules
published by Safeguard …” at the end of Paragraph 1 in the Interim Distributor Agreement could
mean Thurston had a right to “sell” products “at the price schedules Safeguard publishes to other
distributors.” [Resp. Br. at 34 (emphasis added).] That explanation outright fails because there is
no reference to “other distributors” in the plain language. Furthermore, Paragraph 1 actually states
only that Thurston had a right to “solicit the sale” of products at certain retail prices. That is
fundamentally different from Thurston’s claim of a right to uniform commission levels (or “base”
prices) after sales are fulfilled by SBS. And, again, as much as Thurston may wish to walk back
its testimony now, Mr. Thurston admitted on the stand, under oath, that the “price schedules” in
Paragraph 1 are only “suggested retail prices” for customers.15 As the District Court correctly
determined at summary judgment, there is no mention of uniformity as to commission rates or
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[Tr. Vol. II at 1861:20-24 (“Q. My question to you is the price schedule that is referenced here,
that is [SBS] suggested retail prices for sale to the customer, correct? A. That is the suggested
retail prices and any changes you can do through the CMS system.”) (emphasis added).]
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“base prices” among distributors in the plain language of the contract. [See R. 5814 (District Court
stating that, “[w]hile Paragraph 1 does not expressly require Safeguard to offer the same price
schedules and charge the same source fees to all of its distributors …”) (emphasis added).]
Where the District Court’s analysis went awry was further offering that the concluding
language of Paragraph 1 (“… and on the terms and conditions set by Safeguard from time to time“)
could create ambiguity as to whether SBS set a requirement of uniformity outside the contract.
[See R. 5814.] Yet, that language strongly indicates that SBS has complete discretion to modify
retail “price schedules” such that Thurston’s claim fails. Nevertheless, if such a phrase creates
ambiguity, the only type of ambiguity it could possibly create is a latent ambiguity regarding what
SBS’s other “terms and conditions” stated. As a result, if no latent ambiguity was shown to exist
(i.e., if there was no evidence of other relevant terms and conditions), then the analysis goes back
to the plain language and the claim must be dismissed for the same reasons discussed before.
Again, there was no evidence at trial that SBS has any general “terms or conditions”
requiring it to provide uniform base prices or commission levels. [See App. Br. at 27-28.]
Thurston’s response does not dispute that. [See generally Resp. Br. at 33-36.] Consequently, no
ambiguity was shown—patent or latent—and the legal review on JNOV never should have
considered Mr. Thurston’s subjective beliefs regarding the intent behind Paragraph 1. The plain
language simply does not provide a pricing guarantee that would support Thurston’s claims of
being damaged by 40% for all its envelopes and laser check sales to any customer over three years.
[See Resp. Br. at 33; R. 19613 (illustrating breadth of damages sought).]
Contrary to Thurston’s suggestions as well, there is nothing “superfluous” about a plain
language reading of Paragraph 1. [See Resp. Br. at 34.] SBS can publish suggested retail prices
for distributors to use (much like a “manufacturer’s suggested retail price,” or MSRP, at a
dealership), have other terms and conditions that give distributors the flexibility to offer lower
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retail prices to customers for a compressed commission (i.e., the “flex pricing” program), and at
the same time provide discounts for individual situations as appropriate to the business. Further,
nothing prevents a distributor, including Thurston, from negotiating better rates than other
distributors. As a matter of fact, Mr. Thurston admitted at trial that his company received such
favorable special discounts at times [see Tr. Vol. II at 1862:14-21], confirming he knew Paragraph
1 was limited to retail prices for customers – not base prices or commissions. Indeed, it is only by
reading the language as Thurston proposes that Paragraph 1 becomes nonsensical, because then it
would mean SBS agreed, by way of a contract with Thurston, to bar itself nationwide from being
able to give discounts to get a new customer in the door or encourage high-volume orders.
The final argument by Thurston—that SBS waived any ability to argue the contract is not
ambiguous [see Resp. Br. at 34]—is roundly rejected by Idaho law. In its post-judgment order, the
District Court did indeed suggest that SBS may be estopped from arguing Paragraph 1 is not
ambiguous because SBS’s opposition to summary judgment on the issue referred to a “fact
dispute.” [See R. 12730.] To the extent the District Court so ruled, however, that was plain error.
SBS plainly opposed Thurston’s summary judgment on the substantive basis that:
… [N]othing in this provision (or in the attached addenda, for that matter) says
anything about the price schedules available to [Thurston] tracking with those of
every other distributor nationwide. Thus, contrary to [Thurston’s] argument, SBS
was under no contractual obligation to offer the same pricing schedules to
[Thurston] as those of other distributors, and it therefore follows that SBS did not
breach Section 1 of the Distributor Agreement.
[R. 5415 (citations omitted).] Although SBS’s briefing generally referred to the above as creating
a “factual dispute” preventing summary judgment [id.], the argument centered on the unambiguous
legal effect of the contract’s plain language. Further, as a matter of law, estoppel applies only to
preclude a party from “advantageously taking one position, then subsequently seeking a second
position that is incompatible with the first.” See Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Witherspoon,
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Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S., 159 Idaho 679, 686-87, 365 P.3d 1033, 1040-41 (2016). There
is nothing “incompatible” between SBS’s summary judgment and JNOV arguments (both are
based on the plain language) and SBS received no “advantage” by referring to a fact dispute at the
summary judgment stage. The mere denial of summary judgment left the claim pending. If that
created an advantage to anyone, it accrued to Thurston because then there was still an opportunity
to prove the claim before SBS moved for its own judgment as a matter of law (as SBS did in its
JNOV motion). Accordingly, there was no estoppel of SBS’s JNOV argument.
As requested in the opening brief, this Court should eliminate the so-called “pricing” claim
and its damages ($156,628) regardless of a reversal of the judgment otherwise.
V.

THE GOOD FAITH-FAIR DEALING CLAIM REMAINS DUPLICATIVE AND UNSUPPORTED.
In the opening brief, SBS argued that the GFFD claim should be eliminated on grounds

that: (a) the District Court erred in denying summary judgment on the claim, (b) Thurston
improperly shifted damage theories halfway through trial, and (c) there is insufficient evidence to
support the theory that Thurston was transformed into a non-Safeguard distributor or suffered a
two-thirds loss in “marketability.” SBS addresses Thurston’s responses to each below.
A.

Error on the Summary Judgment Ruling Was Not Waived.

Thurston asserts waiver based on a belief that SBS never argued for its own summary
judgment that the GFFD claim was duplicative of the express contract claims. [See Resp. Br. at
36-37.] However, Thurston takes too broad a view of waiver and too narrow a view of the record.
SBS argued in its summary judgment reply that the GFFD claim did not exist because it provides:
… (1) no additional rights beyond the rights provided for in the parties’ contract;
and (2) provides no avenue for recovery of any additional damages than what would
be recoverable if [Thurston] succeeds on its breach of contract claim.
[R. 5665.] Further, the District Court’s order stated:
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… Thurston points out that its breach of implied covenant claim is not based on
Safeguard’s violation of an express provision of the RDA and, therefore, it can be
asserted independently. This Court agrees.
[R. 5815.] The District Court’s basis for its ruling is subject to challenge regardless of whether an
argument was made in the briefing. Further, this Court requires only a general legal issue to be
raised (as it was in SBS’s briefing), not the exact same legal arguments. See Ada Cty. Highway
Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, 143n.2, 395 P.3d 357, 361 n.2 (2017). There is no waiver
of the summary judgment argument, which should be dispositive because Thurston offers no
response to the point that DocuSource and IBF were separate legal “persons” that SBS was entitled
to appoint to make sales in Idaho. [See generally Resp. Br. at 37-38 (failing to respond to App. Br.
at 30-31).] The GFFD claim should have been dismissed on summary judgment.
B.

Thurston Misrepresents its Obligation to Disclose Damage Theories.

In regard to Thurston’s change in damage theories at trial, Thurston falsely certifies to this
Court that there was no “discovery or expert disclosure obligation that Thurston failed to respond
to.” [See Resp. Br. at 39.] First, SBS requested disclosure of witness testimony as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO. 3:
Identify each person whom you intend to call as a lay witness in the trial of this
action, and provide the factual substance of his or her expected testimony at trial.
[THURSTON’S] RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3:
… The factual substance of their respective expected testimony, to the extent it
is known by Plaintiffs at this time, can be derived or ascertained from the Second
Amended Complaint and Plaintiffs response to Defendants’ Request for
Production of Documents. …
[See R. 11362.] Nothing in the Second Amended Complaint or documents produced prior to trial
disclosed that Mr. Thurston would be testifying his business was transformed into a non-Safeguard
distributorship or giving an opinion of $0 in value. In addition, Thurston is well aware that
Deluxe’s interrogatories specifically requested information on all damage theories as follows:
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INTERROGATORY NO. 24:
Please set forth in detail a complete itemization, specifying the amount and
method of computation of actual damages for commercial loss claimed by you,
or to which you claim entitlement from Defendant, and identify each document
that supports this claim.
….
[THURSTON’S] AMENDED RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 24:
Thurston Enterprises has provided the requested information through its expert
disclosures.16
Clearly, Thurston had an obligation to disclose “the amount and method of computation of actual
damages for commercial loss claimed by you ….” Yet, Thurston’s expert disclosure contained no
reference to the “two-thirds/transformed into non-Safeguard distributor” theory that was first
unveiled at trial. [See, e.g., R. 3718 (disclosing only a forced sale theory).] As such, the District
Court erred in summarily denying SBS’s objection to the new damages theory. The theory should
have been barred and the GFFD claim should be eliminated for this reason alone.
C.

There is Not Sufficient Evidence to Support a Breach or Damages.

In the opening brief, SBS challenged the District Court’s post-judgment ruling that found
sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude Thurston was “transformed” into a non-Safeguard
distributor. All the evidence, viewed in a way most favorably to Thurston, shows that the most
16

This Court has the inherent power to consider any matter that threatens the integrity of its
proceedings. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991); see also I.A.R. 11.2(a).
Thurston’s false certification that it had no obligation to disclose damage theories should not be
sanctioned simply because the rules provide interrogatory responses are not filed and, if the Court
so requests, SBS can augment the record with all of Thurston’s interrogatory responses. Appellate
courts in other jurisdictions recognize they can take judicial notice of a document outside the
record when its authenticity cannot be disputed. See, e.g., Brandes Meat Corp. v. Cromer, 537
N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (“The Court of Appeals has also recognized a narrow
exception, which allows the consideration, on appeal, of reliable documents, the existence and
accuracy of which are not disputed, even for the purposes of modifying or reversing the order
under review.”). Thurston cannot in good faith deny the authenticity of its own discovery
responses. [See R. 36 (certifying service of interrogatory responses in record).]
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Thurston lost was a small portion of its overly broad concept of account protection (i.e., that based
on sales made by others to entire organizations) that impacted up to 1.9% of Thurston’s accounts.17
[See App. Br. at 33.] If, as Thurston argues, the value of its business is founded entirely on the
account protection right, that shows a loss of 1.9% of the business’s value, not a loss of 66% (or
“two-thirds”). In any case, whatever small loss occurred in terms of account protection (if any) is
fully recouped through compensatory damages. Such a recovered loss for breach of an express
contract right cannot support a GFFD claim without being duplicative. As explained in Idaho First
Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., a GFFD claim:
… does not result in a cause of action separate from the breach of contract claims,
nor does it result in separate contract damages unless such damages specifically
relate to the breach of the good faith covenant. To hold otherwise would result in a
duplication of damages awarded for breach of the same contract.
121 Idaho 266, 289, 824 P.2d 841, 864 (1991) (emphasis added). Duplication is what occurs when,
as the District Court did, a GFFD claim is sustained on the basis of express contract breaches. [See
R. 12721 (JNOV order stating GFFD damages were “proximately caused by Safeguard’s breaches
of the distributor agreement”).] Thurston’s only response is that SBS’s argument “is irrelevant to
a determination of the JNOV motion and is also inaccurate,” but Thurston provides no law or facts
to the contrary. The District Court’s error in sustaining the GFFD verdict on the basis of express
contract breaches is grounds for elimination of the claim through this appeal.
In addition, there is insufficient evidence to support a loss of two-thirds in “marketability”
[see R. 12723], which is a separate reason why JNOV should have been granted. To be clear, there
was no evidence the business could not be sold. All Mr. Thurston did was testify he thought the
current value was $0 (contrary to his own expert’s opinion of $798,647). That is far too speculative
to be sufficient evidence. In response, Thurston notes this Court accepts the testimony of a property
17

Again, Thurston attempts to far overstate the true overlap. [See, supra, page 2 at footnote 3.]
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owner that their business is valueless without regard to foundation. [Resp. Br. at 41 (citing Hurtado
v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 278 P.3d 415 (2012); Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v. Akzo
Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho 41, 896 P.2d 949 (1995)).] Yet, neither of the cases cited by Thurston
involved a property owner claiming a full 100% loss despite overwhelming evidence to the
contrary. In Pocatello, while this Court did treat a business owner’s testimony that her business
was worth nothing after a termination without notice as sufficient to support a damage award even
when the owner could provide no basis for the opinion, it was highlighted that the rationale for
doing so is based on an owner being “presumed, in a way, to be familiar with its value, by reason
of inquiries, comparisons, purchases, and sales.” 127 Idaho at 43-44 (citing Beech v. Am. Sur. Co.
of New York, 56 Idaho 159, 51 P.2d 213, 215 (1935)). That strongly indicates the presumption can
be rebutted by an owner admitting they made no recent inquiries, comparisons, or such, and that
such speculative testimony should be rejected as insufficient, consistent with all the jurisdictions
that reject unsupported opinions of a property owner no less than that of qualified experts. [See
App. Br. at 34-35 n.17 (citing authorities).] That is the rule this Court should follow to ensure the
integrity of damage awards or else plaintiffs can be rewarded for making up baseless opinions
(without fear of perjury as well, since they are mere “opinions”). When doing so here, Mr.
Thurston’s speculation that his business was worth $0 fails to hold any weight as evidence.
Further, even if Mr. Thurston’s lack of foundation for his opinion as to current value only
goes to the weight of evidence, that does not mean I.R.C.P. 50(b)’s requirements are automatically
met. There still must be “substantial” evidence upon which a jury could have based its verdict,
which means the evidence must be “of sufficient quality and probative value that reasonable minds
could arrive at the same conclusion as did the jury.” See Schwan’s Sales Enters., Inc. v. Idaho
Transp. Dept., 142 Idaho 826, 830, 136 P.3d 297, 301 (2006) (emphasis added). Evidence that is
not grounded in “established fact [or] undisputable common experience” is not sufficient. Id. at
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831. The undisputed evidence that Thurston continued operating after the acquisitions (as it does
to this day) and was paid all commissions due for its own sales, making even more money than
before, plus the fact that the alleged breach affects up to only 1.9% of Thurston’s accounts, means
no reasonable mind could conclude there was a two-third’s total loss the business’s value.
Thurston further contends that Mr. Thurston had a foundation for his opinion, based on his
purchase of non-Safeguard businesses in 2000, 2004, and 2012. [See Resp. Br. at 41 (citing
testimony).] While that may be sufficient to establish the past value of a non-Safeguard business
as approximately two-thirds less than a Safeguard distributorship, it does nothing to support the
conclusory opinion that Thurston’s business could not be sold (i.e., “marketability”). Mr. Thurston
admitted not knowing if there were any potential buyers (which would include SBS) or what they
would pay. The opinion was thus no less speculative than a homeowner who bought a house many
years ago throwing his or her hands up and saying the house cannot now be sold without ever
listing the property or even checking with an active real estate agent to find out. Such speculation
should not be presumed support for the $2.1 million in compensatory and punitive damages at
issue with this claim.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should eliminate the GFFD claim as duplicative of
express contract breaches and, to the extent it does not fail for that reason, reject the impermissibly
speculative testimony of Mr. Thurston as insufficient to establish any damage.
VI.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT REMAIN INAPPROPRIATE.
In the opening brief as to Issue 6, SBS put forth two main reasons why the punitive damages

for breach of contract (totaling $3,080,871 here) should be fully eliminated from this case: (i) the
circumstances are not sufficient to warrant punitive damages under current Idaho law, and, (ii)
otherwise, Idaho law should be modified to exclude punitive damages for breach of a commercial
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contract in a case like this. [See App. Br. at 36-45.] The following two sections reply to the various
arguments Thurston offers in response to each.
A.

Thurston Improperly Relies on the Fraudulent Inducement Claim.

Thurston’s response provides a bulleted list of evidence for punitive damages that each
pertain to only one of two things: (i) that SBS knew there would be account protection issues
before the acquisitions, and (ii) evidence related to the alleged fraudulent inducement of the March
2014 agreement. [See Resp. Br. at 45-46.] Neither is sufficient to support punitive damages here.
As explained in the opening brief, no amount of evidence on the first point can show an
extremely harmful state of mind towards Thurston when it lost no sales of its own. [See App. Br.
at 38-41.] Although Thurston wishes to discount the Cuddy Mountain factors now [see Resp. Br.
at 43], those are the factors upon which the District Court’s order was based and this Court has
never rejected Cuddy Mountain’s summarization of factors relevant in a contract case.
The second category of evidence cited by Thurston—that relating to “fraud”—is
insufficient as well because it improperly commingles two separate claims for which Thurston
sought and was awarded punitive damages. As apparent from its argument, Thurston is relying
primarily on evidence pertaining to the alleged fraudulent inducement of the March 2014
agreement—a claim on which it was also awarded “maximum” punitive damages—to further
obtain punitive damages on the separate claims for breach of contract, stating:
Safeguard’s efforts, through Dunlap, to strong-arm Thurston into selling his
accounts for nominal amounts18 when they were worth exponentially more were
oppressive. … Contrary to Safeguard’s arguments the negotiations were not in good
faith, they were founded upon fraud. …

18

The “nominal amount” Thurston refers to is $32,600, which was far greater than three years’
worth of commissions Thurston earned on its own sales to the organizations. [See App. Br. at 8.]
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[Resp. Br. at 46-47.]. Thurston cites no evidence of fraudulent conduct pertaining specifically to
the separate breach of contract claims. Nor could any be cited because, once Mr. Thurston asked
for details on the amount of sales being made by IBF to certain overlapping organizations—first
requested only after the March 2014 agreement was concluded [see Ex. 309; Tr. Vol. I at 1127:201128:4, Tr. Vol. II at 1886:15-1889:1])—such information was freely provided. [See Ex. 311.]
There has never been an allegation that the sales information provided by Dunlap at that point was
“fraudulent” and, not long after, Thurston ended all communications in order to file suit.
Accordingly, there is no independent “fraud” sufficient to support punitive damages on the
contract claims. The fraudulent inducement claim stands alone – and on shaky ground at that.19
Further, Thurston does not provide legal support for using a standalone fraudulent
inducement claim for which punitive damages were awarded (i.e., the remaining $1,327,200 in
punitive damages are based on the $442,400 in fraud damages) to further justify awarding
additional punitive damages on other contract claims. I.C. § 6-1604(1) requires clear and
convincing proof of “oppressive, fraudulent, malicious, or outrageous conduct” in regard to each
independent “claim” for which a party seeks punitive damages. Indeed, this Court has rejected
punitive damages for a fraud cause of action when the fraud itself was not outrageous enough,
further indicating the flimsy fraudulent inducement claim here is insufficient to use for punitive
damages on separate breaches of contract. See, e.g., Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass’n, 126 Idaho
1002, 1014, 895 P.2d 1195, 1207 (1995) (affirming denial of leave to amend for punitive damages
regarding fraudulent failure to disclose); see also In re Permann, 174 B.R. 129, 132 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1994) (noting plaintiff introduced no evidence of “willful or malicious conduct on behalf of

19

As discussed in Issue 3, Thurston’s fraud claim hangs by the slimmest thread and should fail on
its own lack of merit.
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John Permann separate and apart from his alleged fraudulent representations which would rise to
the level where punitive damages should be awarded.”). As such, Thurston’s citation of evidence
relating to the alleged fraudulent inducement of the March 2014 agreement is not a sufficient basis
upon which to award punitive damages on the separate contract and GFFD claims.
Setting aside the fraudulent inducement matter—as it should be—there is no independent
justification given by Thurston for contract-based punitive damages beyond a mere recitation of
the terms “malice” and “oppression,” tort-focused labels that, as this case amply demonstrates, are
not suitable for a commercial contract dispute. This is particularly true when a plaintiff cannot
deny it lost no historical profits of its own as a result of the alleged breaches.
B.

All the Economic Rationales Disfavor Awarding Punitive Damages for
Breach of a Commercial Contract.

In response to SBS’s alternative request for Idaho law to be modified, Thurston begins with
a faulty assumption of legislative intent. [See Resp. Br. at 48-49.] Although the Legislature has not
exempted contract cases from punitive damages as a whole, neither has it approved of them for
commercial disputes. As a result, it cannot be inferred that the Legislature takes a position one way
or the other. Furthermore, it is more noteworthy that the Legislature has affirmatively approved of
punitive damages for breach of contract in only one specific type of case: consumer matters. See
I.C. § 48-608(1). Otherwise, the Legislature has left it to this Court to determine when punitive
damages are available. Accordingly, this Court has the power to: (i) determine punitive damage in
this case fall outside current legal standards; (ii) fine-tune Idaho law to exempt commercial
disputes such as this; or (iii) change course entirely and reject punitive damages for anything but
a recognized tort. See, e.g., Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 990, 695 P.2d 369, 375 (1985)
(“While we are cognizant of the importance stare decisis plays in the judicial process, we are not
hesitant to reverse ourselves when a doctrine, a defense, or a holding in a case, has proven over
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time to be unjust or unwise.”).20 SBS argues for the middle ground – to prevent the award of
punitive damages in a commercial contract dispute like this case, as most other states have done
[see App. Br. at 41-42], but especially when, as here, the plaintiff cannot deny it has suffered no
extraordinary harm (or historical loss) as a result of the alleged breaches.
Rather, as explained in the opening brief, the majority of supreme courts to consider the
issue have rejected punitive damages in commercial contract cases for all the reasonable rationales
detailed in the opening brief. That does not mean Idaho is an “outlier” (the pejorative term
Thurston uses [see Resp. Br. at 50]). SBS certainly did not use that term and makes no such
argument. While Idaho is clearly in the minority by not requiring proof of an independent tort, it
is not the only state to do so. [See App. Br. at 41 & n.23 (SBS listing other states in minority).]21
The real “outlier,” in fact, is simply the existence of this case – one in which the maximum punitive
damages possible have been awarded for breach of an ambiguous contract between two
commercial entities, despite the plaintiff being unable to show any special loss to justify a windfall
of nearly $6.8 million (on top of its own ever-increasing profits). SBS could not find and is not
aware of any case with substantially similar circumstances in which punitive damages have been
awarded or upheld. Thurston apparently is not aware of such a case either, since it carefully avoids
addressing the topic of its own profits altogether.
20

This Court in Salinas further noted: “… The court in the proper performance of its judicial
function is required to examine its prior precedents. When precedent is examined in light of
modern reality and it is evident that the reason for the precedent no longer exists, the abandonment
of the precedent is not a destruction of stare decisis but rather a fulfillment of its proper function.”

21

Thurston inflates the number in the minority, however, by: (i) including states that allow punitive
damages for an independent tort [Resp. Br. at 50 & n.29] and (ii) mischaracterizing some of the
cases it cites otherwise. [See Resp. Br. at 50 & n. 28.] In fact, the law review article Thurston relies
on identifies far fewer states in the minority. See William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive
Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629, 644 (1999) (for example, noting Delaware—a state
counted by Thurston—rejects punitive damages for breach of contract due to efficient breach).

30

There are, however, several practical reasons why punitive damages should not be awarded
in a commercial dispute such as this case, as explained by the supreme courts in those states that
expanded their own punitive damages law in the 1970s-80s to apply to commercial contract cases
and subsequently decided it was more prudent to step back. [See App. Br. at 42-43.] Thurston’s
arguments to ignore those courts’ reasoning for doing so are not persuasive.
First, Thurston declares the tort-focused labels of “malice,” “fraud,” and “oppression” do
not create any uncertainty for companies doing business in Idaho, even going so far as to assert
that “Safeguard knew its possible damages, it budgeted for it.” [Resp. Br. at 50.] That is quite
remarkable given Thurston contradictorily criticizes SBS for budgeting only $183,000 and
$64,000 to resolve the account protection issues. [See Resp. Br. at 12 (record cites).] If anything,
those amounts show SBS viewed account protection as based on an affected distributor’s own
sales rather than the far broader interpretation put forth by Thurston for this litigation. The budget
certainly fails to establish that SBS had any idea punitive damages were a possibility.
Next, Thurston asserts the alleged breaches were “opportunistic” and should be punished
based on a law review article arguing for such a standard (which no court has adopted).22 [See
Resp. Br. at 51 (citing Dodge article).] However, that characterization fails to apply under
Thurston’s own definition of opportunistic, which is when a “breaching party gains at the expense
of the nonbreaching party ‘either because the nonbreaching party fails to detect the breach or
because the nonbreaching party cannot afford to bring suit to enforce his rights.’” [Resp. Br. at 51
n.31 (emphasis added).] The evidence of Thurston’s ever-growing profits shows nothing was
gained “at the expense of” Thurston. Thurston did not lose a single dollar of its own profits as a

22

Only one court cites the Dodge article, but not for the “opportunistic” breach concept. See
Monahan v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 893 A.2d 298, 315 n.4 (Vt. 2005).
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result of the alleged breaches. Further, it is difficult to see how the alleged breaches go
“undetected” given that SBS proactively informed Thurston of the acquisitions and overlapping
organizations [see Tr. Vol. I at 855:4-9, 856:12-19, 862:11-25, 863:22-864:5; 1097:22-1098:6; Ex.
68 at 68.2], which demonstrates SBS did not act opportunistically or oppressively, but rather that
this dispute is simply an ordinary one over the scope of account protection. As well, the alleged
damages clearly are not so small23 that no one would bring suit. As a result, the passage Thurston
cites from Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 904-05 453 P.2d 551, 553-54 (1969) (dealing
with consumer odometer rollback causing approximately $350 in damages), has no application
here and the alleged breaches are not “opportunistic” in any sense of Thurston’s proposal.
Thurston’s related contention that there is no “societal economic justification” is contrary
to reason as well. Virtually every party involved stood to benefit from the acquisitions, including:


Thurston – in that the purchase of DocuSource/IBF effectively prevented those
companies from being able to encroach on Thurston’s historical sales made to
its own billing contacts (for which no one denies Thurston has account
protection), or any other account protection that Thurston gains in the future;



SBS and Deluxe – in the form of increased revenue and “insourcing”
opportunities (which hopefully would translate into profits for shareholders or
further re-investment that grows the business for the benefit of all);



Customers (even those within overlapping organizations) – in that they would
have a wider array of products/services available while still being able to buy
from whomever they chose to before (e.g., checks and forms from Thurston;

23

See Richard A. Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 746 (2006) (“If a party to a contract deliberately takes advantage of a gap in
the remedial structure that makes compensatory damages an inadequate remedy, then an award of
additional damages makes sense to deter opportunistic conduct not otherwise deterred. These cases
will be extremely rare, and perhaps limited to very small contracts, where it just doesn’t pay to
sue without a boost in expected damages. In the ordinary case, the victim’s legitimate interests are
fully protected by an award of compensatory damages, whether or not the breach was willful.”
(emphasis added)).
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unique specialized high-volume services like W-2 processing, medical ID
bands, warehousing, and drop shipping from IBF); and


The owners of the acquired companies – in that they were able to cash out on
their own work by selling their revenue streams to SBS.

The only real potential net losers are the manufacturers who competed with Deluxe. Doing what
Thurston demands, however—trying to dictate to customers who they can and cannot purchase
from (even if Thurston could not service them) or paying twice for the acquired revenues—is
where the economics of the acquisitions fall apart. Adding in unpredictable tort-focused punitive
damages skews everything out of proportion.
The only recognized justification for punitive damages that Thurston offers is “deterrence.”
[Resp. Br. at 52.] As explained in the opening brief, punitive damages for contract breach certainly
do deter defendants from resorting to courts when they dispute a contract’s terms (for fear of being
deemed “outrageous” or “unreasonable” in their understanding, such as Thurston has done here in
regard to “account protection”). [See App. Br. at 42-44.] However, Thurston uses the word in the
more classical sense of deterring conduct altogether. That type of deterrence can make sense for
torts where a defendant should be dissuaded from causing physical harm to the general public.
However, deterrence in the realm of private commercial contracts means that economically
beneficial activities involving a potential breach of contract are deterred, resulting in inefficient
outcomes given the nonbreaching party is made entirely whole by compensatory damages. A
Harvard Law Review article widely cited by courts explains:
[I]f injurers are made to pay more than for the harm they cause, wasteful
precautions may be taken, product prices may be inappropriately high, and risky
but socially beneficial activities may be undesirably curtailed,” and ultimately
concludes: “… courts should be cautious about awarding punitive damages for
breach of contract. This point is worth noting because the law governing the
imposition of punitive damages for breach of contract does not restrict their award
to cases in which the likelihood of escaping liability for breach is substantial.
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A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 869, 873 (1998). Polinsky and Shavell’s concern about the legal standards is particularly
relevant here, where vague tort labels like “malice,” “fraud,” and “oppression” (and the District
Court’s lowered bar in particular) are the standards by which a breach of contract is judged.
Contrary to Thurston’s suggestion as well, Judge Posner, formerly of the Seventh Circuit,
is highly adverse to punitive damages for breach of contract (even willful breaches), explaining:
This discussion, however, leaves unanswered the basic question, which is whether
punitive damages should ever be awarded for a breach of contract. The general rule
denying such damages for breach makes good economic sense. Quite apart from the
fact that many breaches are either efficient or involuntary, many contracts contain
an insurance component even when they are not insurance contracts. An example
is when by promising performance that may prove beyond the promisor’s ability to
deliver, the promisor assumes the risk of failure and thus insures the promisee
against the consequences of failure. There is no ‘wrongdoing’ when the risk
materializes; the ‘breach’ is the equivalent to an insured event coming to pass,
obligating the insurance company to pay insurance proceeds to the insured.
Richard A. Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 735, 745-46 (2006) (emphasis added). If, as Thurston insists, there is a substantial premium
for Safeguard distributorships due to the account protection and other benefits provided by SBS
[see Resp. Br. at 10],24 then Judge Posner’s “insurance” analogy applies here.
Simply put, there are no good economic reasons for punitive damages in a commercial
contract dispute. This case certainly demonstrates that much. Such damages distort the
predictability of contracts and conflict with the compensatory principles that work in harmony.
For all the reasons discussed here and in the opening brief, this Court should eliminate the punitive
damages awarded for breach of contract ($3,080,871), whether or not modifying Idaho law.
24

Further premium exists in the residual commissions after a contract ends, which set the absolute
outer limit of Thurston’s expectation damages. [See Ex. 8 at 8.8 (¶ 9(B)) (providing for payment
of 50% of commissions on “repeat” sales for 4 years).]
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VII.

THE FUTURE DAMAGES STILL SUFFER FROM FATAL LEGAL ERRORS.
For Issue 7, SBS challenged the future damages on three grounds: (1) the District Court’s

improper disregard of a discount rate to sustain damages for 8+ years; (2) the failure of Thurston’s
expert to consider attrition rates as they apply to account protection; and (3) the at-will nature of
the Interim Distributor Agreement. The corresponding paragraphs below address Thurston’s
arguments as to each category.
First, Thurston asserts the faulty 1xAS (“one times annual sales” or revenue) metric used
by its expert, Robert Taylor, equates to only “approximately three years of commissions.” [Resp.
Br. at 54.] Yet, the testimony cited by Thurston pertained only to a hypothetical of how “multiples”
work in business acquisitions. Thurston ignores Taylor’s later testimony on the appropriate
discount rate and that, when using it, he testified the damages would cover more than eight years
of future lost commissions.25 [See Tr. Vol. II at 1578:14-1579:24.] The District Court made the
same error by ignoring a discount rate altogether. See Watkins Co., LLC v. Storms, 152 Idaho 531,
539, 272 P.3d 503, 511 (2012) (discount rate required for future lost profits). Thurston goes on to
assert it would be entitled to damages into “perpetuity” anyway by making at least one sale every
three years. [Resp. Br. at 55.] That is not logical for two reasons: (i) the contract is terminable atwill (as discussed in the third paragraph below), and (ii) Thurston treats the damages as a complete
sale and transfer of its rights as of a date certain. To say Thurston could extend its account
protection indefinitely is irrelevant. Three years of commissions is the absolute max the contract
could support. The 1xAS metric grossly overcompensates Thurston for 8+ years into the future.

25

Thurston seeks to re-characterize the future losses as “market value damages.” [Resp. Br. at 54.]
There is no explanation as to how that would result in a different analysis, but, either way, Taylor
repeatedly referred to the damages he calculated as an estimate of lost “future commissions” [see,
e.g., Tr. Vol. II at 1469:19-1470:1], not a loss in business value.
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Second, Thurston seeks to nullify Taylor’s failure to consider the known attrition rates by
speculating that a natural loss of overlapping organizations might not occur if IBF increases its
sales to other overlapping organizations. [See Resp. Br. at 55-56.] That is even more speculative
than Taylor’s explanation. Regardless, the fact remains that Taylor acknowledged he did no
analysis of the attrition rates at all because “… all I’m doing is using the metric that Safeguard is
using …” for acquisition purposes (i.e., 1xAS). [See Tr. Vol. II at 1593:3-19.] The failure to do an
analysis contributes to the conclusion that Taylor’s method was too speculative to sustain.
Finally, in regard to the Interim Distributor Agreement existing on an at-will basis,
Thurston claims the “argument” was waived by not being raised to the District Court. That is not
correct. SBS plainly argued in its post-judgment brief that “Taylor’s opinions regarding future
losses fall into the impermissibly speculative category because he ignored known limitations
regarding … the terminable nature of the contract at issue.” [R. 9167]; see also Ada Cty. Highway
Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, 143n.2, 395 P.3d 357, 361 n.2 (2017) (only legal
issues—not arguments—must be previously raised). The legal issue of the contract’s terminable
nature was raised. As to the merits, Thurston offers that the Interim Distributor Agreement is not
at-will because it was renewed by the addendums, the last of which is dated in 2004 (approximately
10 years prior to the acquisitions) and they stated the contract remained in force at that time. [Resp.
Br. at 57.] Acknowledging the contract was still in force in 2004, however, does no more than (at
best) push the five-year term to 2009, and then the contract again has an indefinite duration which,
as a matter of law, “remains in force at the will of the parties.” See Cox v. City of Pocatello, 77
Idaho 225, 232, 291 P.2d 282, 286 (1955); see also I.C. § 28-2-309. The District Court thus erred
in refusing to consider the future damages were excessive by construing the parties’ relationship
as terminable only under the “conditions” stated in Paragraph 7(C). [See R. 12728-29.]
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Due to the legal errors with Taylor’s approach, future damages must be eliminated in whole
($263,357, plus $790,071 in punitive damages). In the alternative, at least those related to
DocuSource alone ($21,488, plus $64,464 in punitive damages) must be eliminated.
As to the alternative relief limited to DocuSource damages alone, Thurston contends the
undisputed testimony of DocuSource’s manager (Amy Tiller-Shumway) was a matter of
credibility which the jury could reject. [Resp. Br. at 56.] That misses the point on appeal. Even if
a jury could reject the only evidence on a particular topic and conclude the exact opposite (without
a shred of evidence to support the contrary), the issue here is whether Taylor’s damage figures had
sufficient support to be “evidence” at all. Taylor, as an expert witness, noted an assumption
embedded into his calculation of future losses: that DocuSource/IBF sales in Idaho would continue
in the future. [See Tr. Vol. II at 1504:6-20, 1595:6-11.] That assumption absolutely failed as to
DocuSource (even excluding Tiller-Shumway’s testimony). Accordingly, Taylor’s damages as to
DocuSource were impermissibly speculative and, as a matter of law, a jury could not rely on his
figures. See Inland Grp. of Cos., Inc. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 133 Idaho 249, 257, 985 P.2d
674, 682 (1999) (stating that “awards based upon speculation and conjecture will not be allowed”).
VIII. SBS’S REQUEST TO REDUCE THE FEE AWARD IS UNDISPUTED.
Thurston gave no response to Issue 8. As a result, it can be presumed that Thurston does
not oppose the attorneys’ fees awarded by the District Court being reduced if any part of Thurston’s
judgment is modified due to the issues appealed by SBS.
IX.

THURSTON IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES UNDER I.C. § 12-121.
SBS does not dispute that the prevailing party in this appeal is entitled to its attorneys’ fees

under I.C. § 12-120(3) and its costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40. Yet, Thurston seeks fees under I.C. §
12-121 as well. In regard to that statute, this Court has recently recited:
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An award of attorney fees under [I.C. § 12-121] is not a matter of right to the
prevailing party, but is appropriate only when this Court, in its discretion, is left
with the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. … Moreover, when deciding whether
attorney fees should be awarded under I.C. § 12–121, the entire course of the
litigation must be taken into account and if there is at least one legitimate issue
presented, attorney fees may not be awarded even though the losing party has
asserted other factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation. … Such circumstances exist when an appellant has only asked the
appellate court to second-guess the trial court by reweighing the evidence or has
failed to show that the trial court incorrectly applied well-established law. …
Generally, attorney fees will not be awarded where the losing party brought the
appeal in good faith and where a genuine issue of law was presented. …
In Re SRBA Case No. 39576 Subcase No. 37-00864, No. 44716, 2018 WL 1124264, at *11 (Idaho
Mar. 2, 2018) (citations and editing omitted). Further, an appeal is not frivolous simply because
the appellant presents arguments that are ultimately rejected. See Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462,
259 P.3d 608, (2011) (“Rather, the question is whether the position adopted was not only incorrect,
but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation”);
see also Hammer v. City of Sun Valley, 163 Idaho 439, 414 P.3d 1178, (2016) (denying award of
attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 because law was not settled).
This Court is not being invited to merely “reweigh the evidence.” Rather, SBS presents
reasonable arguments for each Issue that existing Idaho law was violated, or makes a good faith
request for the extension of Idaho law, to vacate the judgment of the District Court. Thurston fails
to establish, and the record does not indicate, that SBS brought or pursued this appeal in any form
of unreasonable or frivolous manner. Attorney’s fees under I.C. § 12-121 are not warranted.
CONCLUSION
SBS requests this Court grant the relief requested in the opening brief and further reject
Thurston’s requests for attorneys’ fees on appeal.
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